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Chapter pages in book: (p. 63 - 78)LESSONS OF CANADIAN FINANCE IN TWO WORLD WARS
WhenCanadaentered the first World War a. century had passed
since she had been involved in a major armed conflitt. She had no
experience to guide her policy, or even to indicate what difficulties
would arise. There was no one in government, business, or finance
who had ever grappled with war problems, and there were very few
professional economists in the country. As Dr. Mackintosh (now
Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Finance) has said, the
War Boards "asked and received but little aid from Canadian econo-
mists. Too often the advice offered was in the nature of a sermon on
the danger of tampering with ecOnomic laws, when what was desired
was 'practical advice'."48
Theaims of war finance were modest. The primary objective of
the government and the public alike appears to have been "business
as usual" and the need for direct action to expand general produc-
tion seems to have occurred to few. The prevention of inflation was
no part of government policy, and the relationship between war
finance and inflation was misunderstood both in government and in
financial circles. Business recession was accepted with resignation as
the inevitable aftermath of war.49 In fact, the government undertook
little direct responsibility for war production: only limited direct
controls were imposed on the allocation of raw materials, labor and
final products; modest use was made of the tax instrument as a
source of revenue or as a counter-inflationary device; and fiat money
was issued. The government failed to stress the need for participa-
tion of the middle- and lower-income groups in war savings, and
allowed the financial system much freedom in the determination of
its own behavior.
Canadian economic policy in War II has obviously benefited from
experience gained during and after War I. This time the dangers
have been more clearly foreseen and the methods of dealing with
48Economics,Prices and the War, Bulletin No. 31 of the Department o History and
Political and Social Science, Queen's University (April 1919) p. 1.
49Therelationship between Canadian financial thought and policy in the first World
War is treated at some length in the author's report to the Advisory Committee on
Reconstruction, The War and Postwar Cycle in Canada (mimeographed, Ottawa, 1943).
See also Sir Thomas White, Budget Speeches, and The Story of Canada's War Finance
(1921); V. Ross, History of the Canadian Bank of Comrnerce.(Toronto, 1922) pp.
352-73; F. Walker, Canadian Banking (Canadian Bank of Commerce, 1923); and the
Canadian Annual Review, 1913-22.
6them better understood.. The government has been determined
from the first to stimulate a large-scale war effort, and at the same
time, to contrpl price inflation and minimize postwar disturbances.
In contrast to its predecessor of the first World War, the government
has been able to draw upon a sizable personnel —inbusiness,
finance, government service and academic life —withspecial train-
ing and experience valuable in the conduct of war finance. Virtually
every known weapon in the anti-inflation arsenal has been used to
some extent, and the government has kept a firm grip on financial
policy. The differing results should be instructive, and this section
contains some speculations on the significance of these differences.
The Financial System in World War I
Compared to War II, the war effort in War I was on a small scale.
Combined British and Canadian war expenditures in Canada were
well below a fifth of gross national product,5° and per capita costs of
war and demobilization for the six fiscal years 19 15-20 were less than
one-fifth of estimated per capita costs of war for the five fiscal. years
1 94O44.h1
The fiscal and direct controls in War I were scaled to match the
war effort. Per capita tax collections rose only from $i6.5ô to $27.41,
and total tax receipts never reached 6 percent of national income;
they exceeded 5 percent of total expenditures only in fiscal 1916.
Even in the last year of the war, special war taxes raised only i8 per-
cent of the total current revenue, scarcely more than was raised in
the United States by personal income tax alone.52 Prohibition of
50 The chief sources for figures cited in this section are the following: F. H. Brown,
"The History of Canadian War Finance 1914-20," Canadian War Finance (Toronto,
1940); J. J. Deutsch, "War Finance and the Canadian Economy, .1914-20," Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science (November 1940); F. A. Knox, "Canadian
War Finance and the Balance of Payments, 1914-18," ibid. (May 1940); C. A. Curtis,
"The Canadian Banks and War Finance," Contributions to Canadian Economics,
Vol. III (1931); F. H. Underhill, "Canada and the Last War," Martin (editor), Canada
in Peace and War (Toronto, 1941); Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Rela-
tions, Report (1940) Chapters III, IV, V; DBS, Prices and Price Indexes, 1913.40 and
Economic Statistics of Canada, 1919-30; Budget Speeches; Canadian Annual Review;
The Canada Year Book; and special series prepared by the Advisory Committee on
Reconstruction. -
51Wartime Information Board, Canada at War (December 1943) pp. 26-27.
52 The war did, however, provide the incentive for a broadening of the Canadian tax
system which resulted irs lasting reform. Before the war, customs duties plus excises
on liquor and tobacco accounted for 90 percent of total tax revenue. During the war,
64strikes and lockouts, regulation of rents, an Order-in-Council for-
bidding accumulation of "unreasonable" stocks and requiring
"hoards" to be sold at "just" prices were about the extent of the
direct controls. A Board of Grain Supervisors to cooperate with the
Allied purchasing agency in allocating the grain supply, a Food Con-
trol Office to conduct investigations and undertake limited rationing
measures, and a Fuel Controller to "worry" about the new pressure
upon the coal supply when the United States entered the war, were
established. Price fixing was more extensive immediately after the
war, under the Combines and Fair Prices Act, than during the war
itself.
In the financial sphere, the main item of direct control was the
Order-in-Council of i 917forbiddingthe issue of new securities by
provincial governments, municipalities, or corporations without the
consent of the Ministry of Finance. The object of this measure seems
to have been the assurance of an adequate market for government
bonds rather than the exercise of discriminatory control over new
investments. There was no formal exchange control during the last
war, but the government had considerable success in maintaining
the Canadian dollar close to par, as long as the pound sterling was
pegged in New York. Somewhat similar to present Lend-Lease ar-
rangements was the agreement under which Great Britain was per-
mitted to use part of the proceeds of American loans to pay for Cana-
dian munitions.
For the most part, Canada financed the last war by an admixture
of borrowing and monetary expansion in both of which the banks
were extremely active. They purchased Treasury bills, subscribed
directly to war loans, bought bonds on the open market, and made
loans to customers to help them buy war bonds. Perhaps even more
important than this direct bank support of government borrowing
was the expansion of credit, since it provided a good deal of the in-
crease in incomes with whch subscriptions to war loans were
financed.
the range of commodity and service taxation was increased, and in 1918 a personal
income tax was introduced for the first time. The exemptions were very high and
rates very low as compared even with modern peacetime income taxes, but its intro-
duction during the last war made possible its effective use in this one. Similarly, the
Business Profits War Tax of 1916 was very light by contemporary standards, but did
serve as the precursor of the Excess Profits Tax of today.
65From December 31,1914to Decembr 31, 1918,thevalue of
Dominion-Provincial securities in bank portfolios increased from
$12 million to $163 million. In the same period, funded debt pay-
able .in Canada rose by about $1.2 billion. Thus even if the rise in
bank holdings of government securities consisted entirely of Domin-
ion obligations, the banks could have assumed directly no more
than one-seventh of the increase in debt.53 Insurance companies
took over io percent of the first two loans, somewhat smaller pro-
portions of the later ones, and their total subscriptions to the end of
1918 were $96 million. Loan and savings companies took $26 mil-
lion, trust companies $15 million. Despite the absence of any payroll
deduction campaign and insignificant use of war savings certificates
and stamps, over half the increase in debt was placed with indi-
viduals and non-financial institutions. The proportion of debt ab-
sorbed by the banking system was actually lower than in the present
war.
The government was anxious that public borrowing should not
interrupt the flow of funds to private enterprise, and adopted strong
measures to assure an easy money market. Under the Finance Act of
1914thebanks were not required to pay out specie; instead they
could issue their own notes and hold any specie coming into their
hands as reserves. Bank notes could be issued in excess of paid-up
capital up to 15percentof capital and reserves, provided a tax of
5 percent was paid on the excess circulation. Beyond that, ioo per-
cent reserves in gold or Dominion notes were required, but since the
banks could borrow Dominion notes from the Department of
Finance for 5 percent and make loans at higher rates, the one curb
53InWorld War I, bank holdings of Dominion-Provincial securities, total money
supply (Canadian deposits plus active note circulation) and funded debt payable in
Canada increased as follows:
- (Fiscal: 19151916191719181919
Increase (in millions).Calendar:19141915191619171918Total
Debt (fiscal years) $0 $99$240$541$595$1,475
Money (calendar year nearest
fiscal year) 10 46 302 138 285 781
Bank holdings of Dominion-
Provincial securities (calendar
year nearest fiscal year) 2 1 17 101 32 153
Source: Canada Year Book, 1914-20.
66on note expansion was the credit demand by eligible borrowers. As
to deposits, the only limit was the customary reserve ratio, which was
easily maintained under the circumstances. "The only real check on
the ability of the banks to expand credit," according to Professor
Curtis, "was the extent to which the operation was profitable."
The printing of $96 million of fiat Dominion notes contributed to
monetary expansion by swelling bank reserves. Bank loans in Canada
expanded by $461 million over the period, and government deposits
increased by $120 million. The net result was that from the end of
1914 to the end of 1918 currency and deposits rose from $i.i billion
to $1.9 billion.
Since the Finance Ministry felt that the proper function of banks
was to provide working capital for agriculture, commerce, and in-
dustry, rather than to lend to the government, official policy took the
line of placing war loans as far as possible outside the banking sys-
tem. Despite this attitude and the liquidity of the money market,
the Finance Ministry embarked upon its progfam of large-scale do-
mestic borrowing with much trepidation. Before the war the gov-
ernment had never raised so much as $millionby public loans,
and in the early months of war the only domestic borrowing con-
sisted of a direct loan of $millionfrom the Bank of Montreal. Not
until November 1915 did the FinanceMinister summon sufficient
courage to float a public loan. Even then, only $50 million were
called for, and the banks were allotted half the issue on the assump-
tion that the public could not be counted upon for more than $25
million, despite tax-free yields of 5½ercent.To everyone's sur-
prise, the loan was heavily oversubscribed. Encouraged by this suc-
cess, government borrowing mounted rapidly, culminating in the
two Victory Loans of October igi8 and November 1919, which
yielded $690 mi1lion and $678 million respectively.55
Lessons for War Finance
Financial policy in the two World Wars has had quite different re-
suits as to war production, prices, and distribution of the "burden"
of war finance. Total physical production apparently did not in-
crease much more than io percent in the last war,56 despite con-
54 Curtis, op. cit., p.28.
55 Curtis, op. cit., p.12.
56See Deutsch, op. cit., and Brown, op. cit.
67siderable prewar unemployment, excess capacity, and the lure pro.
vided by a persistent lag of wage rates behind wholesale prices. Even
in the field of munitions, where more attention was centered than in
any other branch of manufacturing, production during the first war
was less than a sixth of output in the equivalent period of this war.
Although the production effort of War I was relatively small,
wholesale prices rose 99 percent and cost of living 49 percent.57
Nearly all prices were left free to soar at will, but the disparities in
price movements as well as the rise in the general price indices were
greater than in this war. Vegetable products, for example, rose 120
percent, iron and its products 127 percent, fibers and textile mate-
rials 170 percent. Wood and wood products, on the other hand, in-
creased only 39 percent, non-ferrous metals and products only 44
percent, non-metallic minerals and products 45 percent, animals and
their products 79 percent, chemicals 87 percent. Prices of producers'
goods went up approximately 25 percent more than consumers'
goods. Foods, beverages and tobacco rose twice as much as other con-
sumers' goods, and manufacturers' materials rose i 13 percent, com-
pared to a rise of about o percent for construction materials and
producers' equipment.
Still greater diversities of price movement appear when individual
cases are cited. Prices of tin and linseed oil quadrupled, and the price
of wool went up some three-and-one-half-fold, the price of wheat
trebled before being pegged at about two and one-half times its pre-
war level. Yet steel prices increased only 2-5percent,and rubber
prices actually fell.
The effectsof financing the first war upon income distribution are
not altogether clear. Wage rates rose 47 percent, about the same as
cost of living but much less than wholesale prices. They also rose
less than profits, even net of taxes. On the other hand, there was a
big growth in employment of unskilled workers. It would seem that
the middle-income group lost to both lower- and upper-income
groups, and taken as a whole, workers employed when war broke
out -may have suffered some slight dçcline in standard of living.
However, wage movements showed wide differences. Wages of com-
mon labor in steel and- coal companies more than doubled, wages
57 The chief sources of wage and price data for the first war period are DBS, Prices
and Price Indexes, 1913-40, and Cost of Living Index Numbers for Canada, 1913-42;
and Deutsch, op. cit.
68of steel workers and electrical machinists doubled, wages of skilled
moulders went up 128percent,and wages of blacksmiths', mill-
wrights' and electricians' helpers only 62 percent. Apparently, some
labor groups gained, and others, especially white-collar and service
industry workers, were "squeezed," by war finance.
In World War II the expansion of- total physical production has
been many times as great as in War I. At peak 'production, 33 per-
cent of manufacturing capacity was employed on war orders from
abroad, as compared to 70 percent this time. Net exports have been
more than twice as great as in the first World War.
Control of the cost of living in the present war has also been rela-
tively successful to date. An i8 percent rise in cost of living in four
years of war cannot be regarded as serious for the economy as a
whole, and even this moderate increase has been partly the result of
deliberate monetary expansion and exchange depreciation in the
early months of the war. Wholesale prices have risen 40 percent, but
nearly three-quarters of the rise took place before the price ceiling
was established. Since then wholesale prices have been remarkably
stable.
The record of Canadian finance in War II is very impressive as
long as attention is directed only to broad categories of prices; it
becomes less so as price indices are broken down into their com-
ponent parts. Wholesa'e prices have risen i 2 percent more than re-
tail prices, retail prices have gone up. 8 percent more than the cost
of living. Prices outside the ceiling have increased more than those
of regulated commodities. Wholesale prices of foods and industrial
raw materials, many of which do not come under the ceiling, have
risen 34 and 50 percent respectively, while prices of manufactured
goods, which are almost entirely subject to ceiling regulations, have
risen less than 30 percent. Rents have gone up oniyg percent, cloth-
ing only 21 percent.
Similarly, prices of raw and partly manufactured goods have risen
more than twice as much as prices of fully and chiefly manufactured
goods, which have been more rigorously controlled. These. figures
are not, of course, indisputable evidence that price-cost relationships
have been thrown out of line. Compulsory cost reduction, absorp-
tion of excess capacity, and improved techniques have all contributed
to suppression of price rises in the field of manufaciuring, and prices
69of raw and semi-finished goods may very well have been dispropor-
tionately low before the war.
In four years of war, prices of Canadian farm products rose 67
percent, articles of marine origin went up 1 12 percent, while forest
articles rose only 20 percent and mineral commodities only 9 per.
cent. Prices of non-ferrous metals and non-metallic minerals have
gained much less than the general average, while prices of animal
and vegetable products have risen much more than the average.
Building materials prices have gone up less than prices of manufac-
turing materials; prices of field products have shot up a good deal
further than prices of animal products. The contrasts are even more
striking when prices of particular commodities are examined.58 Such
data do not in themselves provide proof of increased price dis-
equilibrium but they do suggest that serious maladjustments may
possibly have developed.
,The effects of war finance on income distribution are somewhat
clearer for War II than for War I. The index of employment has
gone up more than 55 percent, and hours have been increased. Wage
rates, including bonuses, have risen roughly 20 percent, a trifle more
than cost of living and considerably more than profit rates. Per
capita earnings, total wages and salaries, and farm labor income have
attained the highest levels in Canadian history. Taking these facts
in conjunction with the highly progressive tax structure and the
greater importance of the higher incomes as sources of subscriptions
to war loans, it seems certain that there has been a considerable re-
distribution of national real income in favor of wage earners. Since
wage earners' budgets absorb most of their incomes, this redistribu-
tion has tended to increase the demand for consumer goods relative
to voluntary savings. Thus, while War II has been financed in closer
accord with the "ability-to-pay" principle than the previous one, the
consequent redistribution of disposable income has aggravated the
price control problem.59
58 Percentage changes for August 1939-August 1943, based on data from DBS, Prices
and Price Indexes, were:
RawCotton
WheatFlour SteersHidesPulp CheeseCottonYarns
122 —14 9'J 46 139 51 100 16
In contrast, prices of certain luxury goods have fallen.
59 To the extent thai people in the upper-income groups sell assets to finance con-
'70As in the last war, discrepancies in price movements have brought
with them differences in effects upon wages. From 1939to1942, the
index of hourly rates shows increases varying from about ipoints
for builders and printers to about 28 points for unskilled factory
workers and labor employed on steamships and in sawmills.60 Finer
breakdowns show even wider disparities.
This brief outline of effects of war finance on production, prices,
and incomes in the two wars indicates that greater success has been
attained in War II in stimulating production and in controlling
general price levels for civilian goods. There is also some evidence
that the burden has been distributed more equitably. In order to
compare the relative disruption of the price-income structure, how-
ever, the "equilibrium" prices and incomes would have to be known
in each case. Moreover, the civilian proportion of the total economy
is much smaller this time, and it is possible that spreads between
costs and prices and among various prices and incomes —whichin
the civilian sector would be symptomatic of inflation —havede-
veloped in the war sector.
The contrast on the production front can hardly be accounted for
by differences in prewar excess capacity. The government did not
undertake direct investment in war plant and equipment during the
last war on anything like the present scale, nor did it apply the same
controls to assure an. adequate flow of men and materials into war
production. While this greater measure of government control and
risk assumption in War II is unquestionably a factor in the greater
volume of war production, another reason for the difference is sim-
ply that in War I Canada was not called upon to make so great an
effort in the industrial sphere.
The disparities between the price experiences of the two World
Wars are attributable to a difference in the extent to which increases
in money supply were recaptured by war loans and taxes, immobil-
ized by direct controls or offset by increased output; they cannot be
sumption, they can offset to some extent the effects upon their consumption of higher
taxes and increased purchases of government bonds. There is no clear-cut evidence
that any such process has been taking place in this war. Table 11 above shows that
the proportion of net income paid out in dividends has fallen rather than increased.
Common stock prices fell, up to the middle of 1942, but it would be hazardous to
attribute this development to sales by the wealthy in an effort to maintain their
standard of living.
60SeeBank of Canada, Statistical Summary (December 1943-January 1944) p. 16.
71attributed to a difference in the degree of monetary expansion. From
August 31, 1939 to August 31, 1943 the supply of money increased
6o percent. From the end of June 914 until the end of June 1918,
aroughly equivalent period, the supply of money increased 52 per-
cent.61
No doubt the existence of a central bank in War II has assisted
the Finance Ministry in administering monetary policy. The Cen-
tral Bank affords a continuous relationship with the banks, and pro-
vides leadership in banking thought and policy. It has gathered to-
gether a staff of experts, and is thus partly responsible for the marked
difference between the two wars in quantity and quality of goern-
ment personnel skilled in various aspects of finance. Yet the differ-
ence between monetary administraion with, and without, the Bank
of Canada can easily be exaggerated. In the last war, the Bankers'
Association performed many of the functions of a central bank, and
its president served in much the same capacity as a central bank
governor.62 Many of the traditional central banking operations in
the international sphere were undertaken by the chartered banks,
some of which had widespread foreign branches.
The existence of the central bank in War II has facilitated mone-
tary expansion, making special legislation to provide for an ab-
normal increase in the money supply unnecessary. Had a central
bank existed in Canada last time, when the problem of war infla-
tion was less clearly understood, the price level might have risen
somewhat more than it did. As it was, in the first war less than one-
seventh of the increase in government debt was taken by the banks,
while in this war the banking system had absorbed over a third of
the rise in debt up to the Fifth Victory Loan.
In War H, purchases of bonds by the public seem to have been
financed to a larger extent by limitation of its spending and to a
lesser extent by credit expansion. The increase in money supply
was over half of the rise in national debt in the first war, under óne
61 From June 1914 to December 1918, the supply of money went up 68 percent; from
June 1939 to December 1943, the supply of money went up about 70 percent.
62 "I discovered when I was Minister of Finance that the Canadian Banking System is
the most perfect instrument that a Minister of Finance could have at his hand in float-
ing a loan. .. .Whathad I to do? Just call up on the telephone the president of the
Canadian Bankers' Association: 'I want all the branch banks of Canada notified to do
a certain thing.' It was done." Sir Thomas White, in "Federal Administration and the
Banks,' Journal of the Canadian Bankers' Association, Vol. xkix (April 1922) p. 358.
72third in the second. The banks have given somewhat less assistance
to clients subscribing to loans in War II, and the loans have been
more quickly liquidated. They have done little direct financing of
industry, and because of government domination of investment in
war plants, bank investment in government obligations is in part
an indirect form of bank lending to war industry.
War loans have been bigger in the present war, the per capita
yield of the two biggest loans of War I was $170,comparedto $235
forthe Fourth and Fifth Victory Loans of War II. In addition, more
savings have been obtained this time by sales of war certificates and
stamps. Only one person in eight subscribed to the most successful
issue of the last war, while more than one person in four subscribed
to the November 1943loan.Thus it appears that more bonds have
been sold in the lower-income brackets this time. Purchases from the
lower-income brackets usually represent new savings, whereas pur-
chases from the upper-income groups often represent mere diversion
of saving from one type of asset to another. Such being the case, the
greater success in selling bonds to lower-income groups in War II
means a greater increase in personal savings than in War I.
Finally, a larger share of the increased money income of World
War II has been recaptured by taxes; over 50percentof total ex-
penditures and 6o percent of war expenditures has been met by cur-
rent revenues. In the last war, tax collections for the equivalent
period were nearly 70percentof war expenditures, but less than35
percent of total expenditures of the Canadian government. They
were a still smaller percentage of total British and Canadian gov.
ernment outlays in Canada.
The abrupt cessation of the rise in the cost-of-living index that oc-
curred in December i941 mightgive the impression that the wage-
price ceiling imposed at that time was primarily responsible. How-
ever, several additional measures have been necessary to make the
ceiling hold. First, rationing began in January 1942andhas been
gradually extended since. Second, subsidies for keeping prices down
have been paid on an ever-increasing scale. Third, the large loan of
February 1942reducedconsumer purchasing power, and so like-
wise did the still larger loans that followed. Fourth, the higher tax
payments o11 1941andsubsequent incomes exerted a downward
pressure on prices. Finally, except for certain durable goods, few
stringent shortages appeared in the period under consideration.
73The ability of the Canadian government to clamp an effective top
on cost of living and still prevent the appearance of extensive black
markets is less the result of any magic in the wage-price ceiling as
such than it is of supplementary taxes, loans, and rationing that
have prevented total expendable consumer income from rising out
of proportion to the supply of consumer goods. Of course, it may be
that the announcement and enforcement of these ceilings has helped
to allay fears of price rises and so to reduce the incentive to hoard
goods.
During and after the last war, it was fashionable to explain the
rise in prices in terms of "outside forces," which were considered
impossible to control by internal measures. While the unquestion-
ing acceptance of this explanation as complete drew attention
from grave internal forces of inflation, there can be no doubt that
the rise in foreign prices was a contributing factor, especially since
export prices rose more than import prices. Indeed, the increase in
value of the export surplus was a bigger percentage of prewar na-
tional income in War I than it has been in War II. This huge in-
crease in exports alone could have led to a substantial rise in prices,
so long as it was not offset by an increase in total output or by anti-
inflationary fiscal policy3
The question arises, therefore, whether Canada's relative success
in stabilizing prices in War II cannot be explained by the greater
price stability .in the United States and Britain this time. No doubt
foreign price controls have assisted Canada in her efforts to control
inflation, but since Canadian prices have risen less than either British
or American, it seems that internal policies have been the dominant
factor.
If the level of American prices should rise substantially, the task
of holding the Canadian price ceiling would, of course, be more
difficult. American inflation would tend to increase the cost of Cana-
dian products using American equipment and materials, and would
attract other goods away from Canadian markets. The appreciation
63Itis conceivable that offsetting rises in export and import prices with no change in
balance of trade might cause monetary expansion at home in order to finance foreign
trade at the higher price levels. In addition, if the physical export surplus rises more
than domestic production, as it did during the last war, the domestic price level might
rise without monetary expansion through reduced supplies of goods in the home
market. It seems likely, however, that the main inflationary "outside force" of War I
was simply the secondary effect upon money income of the increased export surplus.
74of the Canadian dollar in New York would be only a partial solu-
tion to the problem, since it would not counterbalance the effect of
American inflation on prices of individual Canadian commodities.
Moreover, the Canadian government might consider it advan-
tageous to enter the postwar period with her currency still at a dis-
count in New York, in order to stimulate her export industries at
that time. If stabilization of Canadian internal prices is accepted as
the dominant objective of postwar financial policy, it might be found
that nothing short of a complete government monopoly of foreign
trade would suffice to stabilize export and import prices in Cana-
dian dollars. Decisions of so far-reaching a character clearly have
political as well as economic aspects and involve international as
well as national considerations; It is not inconceivable that efforts
to maintain Canadian currency at an artificially low level would
invite retaliation.
Lessons for Postwar Reconstruction
After a few months' hesitation, a boom developed in Canada during
1919-20. Heavy borrowing by industry, trade, and agriculture, led
to continued monetary expansion and an accelerated price rise.
Fiscal policy, too, was expansionary. Payment for war materials al-
ready produced, completion of war contracts and high costs of demo.
bilization maintained government outlays and deficits on a high
level. Other' factors in the boom were continued high exports, re-
placement demand for housing, and ageneral.aura of optimism.
From the Armistice to the peak in mid-192o, prices rose 45 percent,
cost of living 41 percent, export prices 49 percent, import prices 22
percent, and farm prices 41 percent. while the 'gap between wage
rates and wholesale prices was substantially closed.
The recession that followed was precipitous in Canada as else-
where. Recovery set in late in 1921, but was hesitant and incomplete.
Even in the late twenties the underlying maladjustments of the
Canadian economic structure were not entirely remedied. The great
depression of the thirties was aggravated by structural distortions
which first developed in War I.
Mismanaged war finance was by no means the only cause of these
postwar difficulties. Basic problems inherited from the prewar period,
readjustment to peacetime demands, and new problems and poli-
cies emerging after the war all had their share of responsibility. In
'751913, Canada had reached the end of a long period of expansion
generated by capital imports and the opening of the west.64. Once
the war was over, the problems arising under such conditions reap-
peared. While the war effort did not require substantial reorgani-
zation of the economy, it did redistribute resources by doubling
wheat acreage, accelerating the development of industry, and ab-
sorbing men into the armed forces. This redistribution provided the
postwar period with a problem. of agricultural overexpansion that
has never been entirely solved, excess capacity in certain fields of
industry, and a demobilization task of considerable magnitude.
These factors would have brought difficulties regardless of the
pattern of financial policy; wartime inflation added to them by in-
ducing more reallocation of resources than was required by the war
effort itself. Expansion of the volume of liquid assets laid the foun-
dation for postwar inflation, and the extensive and unbalanced price
rise from 1913 to 1920, with its accompanying new cost rigidities.
made the subsequent price fall highly disturbing for many fields of
enterprise. V
Inthis war, the absorption of men into the armed forces has been
no bigger in relation to the population than in the last one, and
this .timeagricultural acreage has increased very little. On the
other hand, Canada will end the war with something over half her
national product comprising manufactured materials. The demand
for strictly war products, such as ordnance, munitions, armored
vehicles, fighting aircraft, will shrink abruptly after the war. More-
over, the expansion in peacetime industries has consisted largely in
manufactured goods for export to Great Britain. Since Great Britain
normally has exported manufactured goods to Canada and since
there has been an increase also in the manufacturing capacities of
other countries, it is unlikely that Canadian exports can be main-
tained at their present level without worldwide prosperity.
The financing of War II has brought certain developments which,
in the absence of proper safeguards, could lead to serious inflation
in the reconversion period. The quantity of money was already up
more than $2 billion ai the end of 1943; over $i. billion worth of
64 See, for example, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, op. Cit.,
Ch. IV; Deutsch, op. cit.; A. Shortt, Early Economic Effects of the European War upon
Canada (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1918); F. H. Brown,
op. Cit. V
76war bonds was in the hands of non-financial corporations, while
$2.3 billion in war bonds and over $150 million in savings certifi-
cates were in the hands of individuals; in addition, refundable taxes
due individuals and corporations were mounting. Thus tremendous
reserves have been accumulating which could translate growing in-
dividual needs for durable and other consumer goods, and corporate
needs for inventory, equipment and, plant, into effective demands.
Unopposed, these demands: can lead to undesirable price rises dur-
ing.the period of reconstruction if goods are not available to meet
them.
Offsetting and. complicating factors might soon develop. With the
enormous:: manufacturing capacity and large stock piles .ofmany
primary, materials that have been built up for war purpQses, output
of many civilian goods may be greatly expanded. within a short time
after cessation of hostilities, in which case no serious price rise need
develop. Moreover, under conditions in which inflation threatens,
the government may be able to cut expenditures and maintain tax
receipts so that much of the intermediate- and short-term debt held
by businesses and banks could be retired. If this process takes place,
inflationary pressures will be relaxed. There may, of course, be other
forces tending toward credit expansion, such as extension of new
bank loans to private enterprise or bank purchases of government
securities in the open market.
To the extent that wartime discrepancies in price and income
movements prove to be disequilibria in terms of peacetime demands,
serious readjustments in prices and wage rates may be required after
the war. Such readjustments will lead inevitably to temporary losses
and unemployment in certain fields of enterprise. In industries that
have converted to war production and abandoned their peacetime
products, reconversion may bring to light a problem of deflating
costs below present levels or of raising prices above prewar levels to
avoid operating losses.
The three million subscribers to the Fifth Victory Loan notwith-
standing, the data on distribution of wartime borrowing show that
the government has not succeeded altogether in its aim of placing
the debt in the hands of those "who will use the repayments to pro-
vide needed improvements in their standard of living and maintain
themselves against insecurity." However, the fact that so much of
the debt is in the hands of financial institutions and individuals in
77the higher-income brackets diminishes the danger of large-scale
liquidation of war bonds in the postwar period.
On the other hand, industrial and commercial firms, which have
no need to hold large amounts of government bonds as operating
assets, may liquidate their holdings faster than men and materials
become available for normal peacetime production. In addition, if
the wartime distribution of disposable income survives the peace,
the danger of inflation during the transition period will be intensi-
fied, because of the high level of consumer spending that it entails.
Once reconversion is accomplished, of course, this same redistribu-
tion may help to provide a market for increased output of consumer
goods. The growing strength of Canadian trade unions gives some
basis for expecting that much of labor's wartime gains in, wage rates,
and even in total earnings will be retained in peace. Tax refunds
will strengthen postwar. purchasing power of' the middle-income
group in relation to other groups, and it is improbable that this
part of the population would put all of the tax refunds received
mt9 savings.
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